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Gender Classifications and
United States v. Virginia:
Muddying the Waters
of Equal Protection
I. INTRODUCTION
The Commonwealth of Virginia never considered female cadets when
it opened Virginia Military Institute (VMI) in 1839. Nineteenth century
America educated its men and women for different tasks and Virginia
established VMI to produce citizen-soldiers, a decidedly male occupa-
tion.2 At the time, the responsibilites of women were limited to the
home and family.3
That maxim is no longer true, but VMI's founders could not have
foreseen the vast changes in store for society, and for Virginia in partic-
ular. Within three decades of VMI's inauguration, most of its alumni
were fighting for the South in the Civil War.4 The school itself entered
the conflict in May 1864, when VMI cadets battled Union troops at New
Market, Virginia. The cadets' cause ultimately failed, however, and
1. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2277-78 (1996) (outlining the his-
tory of education in Virginia).
2. Id. at 2277-79. In 1879 the Virginia State Senate resolved to look into the pos-
sibility of coeducation, but Virginia's Superintendent of Public Instruction dismissed
the idea as "repugnant to the prejudices of the people." Id. at 2278 n.10 (citing 2
THOMAS WOODY, A HISTORY OF WOMEN'S EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 254 (1929)
(quoting RH.R Doc. NO. 58-5, at 438 (1904))) (internal quotation marks omitted). As an
alternate he proposed an all-female college and in 1884 Farmville Female Seminary
became a public institution. Id. at 2278 & n.10.
3. See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2277 n.9; see also Mississippi Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 727 n.13 (1982) (stating that schools "academically disenfran-
chised" women at that time); Yellow Springs Exempted Village Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic-Ass'n, 647 F.2d 651, 670 (6th Cir. 1981) (noting that
society believed women were unable to attend class on a regular basis because they
were mentally and physically inferior).
4. Almost 1800 VMI graduates (94% of all VMI graduates at the time) fought in
the Civil War. United States v. Virginia, (VMI 1) 976 F.2d 890, 892 (4th Cir. 1992),
affd, 116 S. Ct. at 2264.
5. Id. at 894.
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General Lee surrendered the Confederate Army at Appomattox Court-
house, just sixty-four miles from VMI.6
The Union victory had almost immediate ramifications on the Consti-
tution as states ratified Amendments to legally guarantee broader civil
rights to newly freed slaves.7 Altering the Constitution was not only the
first step toward legally guaranteeing racial equality, but a catalyst for
future change. The Amendments had no effect on women's attendant
role in American society, however, and as racial minorities made sub-
stantial headway, social and legal divisions between the sexes lin-
gered.'
The century between VMI's turbulent beginning and the 1996 Su-
preme Court decision in United States v. Virginia9 was equally dynam-
ic: states amended the Constitution over a dozen times to deal with an
ever-changing American society,'0 America fought and won two world
wars, men walked on the moon, and women made substantial gains as
equal citizens under the law." Almost every facet of American life
changed drastically between the mid-nineteenth and late-twentieth cen-
turies, yet Virginia Military Institute's men-only policy never budged. 2
In Virginia, the United States Attorney General claimed VMI's obdu-
rate position violated equal protection guarantees to women. 3 For the
American public, Virginia put an important social issue on the front
page of almost every newspaper."' The case also had great legal signifi-
6. See Lee's Retreat: The Final Days of the Civil War (visited Mar. 26, 1997)
<http//www.chr.vt.edu/civil war/retreathtml>.
7. Just after the Civil War, the States ratified the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fif-
teenth Amendments, known collectively as the "Reconstruction Amendments." See
infra note 24 (discussing the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments).
8. For example, the Fifteenth Amendment, ratified in 1870, provided that no citi-
zen could be denied the right to vote on account of "race, color, or previous condi-
tion of servitude." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. Women did not gain the right to vote
until the States ratified the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920. Id. at 1291.
9. 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
10. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV-XXVII.
11. See infra notes 74-126 and accompanying text (discussing how women received
equal protection much later than racial minorities).
12. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2277-78. VMI's Mission Study Committee did consider le-
male admissions after the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional a state
supported, all-female nursing school in Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718 (1982) (holding gender classification in a public nursing school's admissions
policy violative of the Equal Protection Clause), but concluded that a lack of interest
by females justified its single-sex character. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2278-79.
13. Brief for Petitioner at 20-49, Virginia (No. 94-1941).
14. See, e.g., Mike Allen, Defiant VMI to Admit Women, but Will Not Ease Rules
for Them, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1996, at Al; Linda Greenhouse, In Supreme Court's
Decisions, a Clear Voice and a Murmur, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1996, at Al; Linda
Greenhouse, The Supreme Court; Discrimination; Military Colleges Can't Bar Worn-
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cance and presented the Supreme Court with a novel opportunity. For
decades the Court had settled similar gender classification cases using a
limber standard of scrutiny prone to producing ad hoc decisions. 5
With a well-reasoned Virginia opinion, the Court could rule on the
government's Constitutional role in single-gender education and clarify
an area of law plagued with inconsistencies. 6 Unfortunately, at the
end of the day, the Court failed both tasks.7
This Note examines the Court's perplexing decision in United States
v. Virginia and its impact on equal protection jurisprudence. Part 11
lays the historical foundation of gender classification equal protection
case law and its application in both military and educational scenari-
os. 8 Part III presents the facts of Virginia,"' and Part IV analyzes the
majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions.' Part V considers the
impact of the Court's decision on single-gender educational pro-
grams.2' The Note concludes with a brief look at the confusion created
by Virginia and a prediction of what may lie ahead for single-gender
programs and institutions at all levels of education.'
1I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Fourteenth Amendment declares that no state may deny any
person equal protection of the laws, thus guaranteeing that the govern-
ment treat all individuals in a similar manner.' Although originally de-
signed to protect the rights of emancipated African Americans,' the
en, High Court Rules, N.Y. TZIES, June 27, 1996, at Al.
15. See infra notes 53-152 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty of ap-
plying this standard consistently).
16. See infr notes 53-152 and accompanying text (discussing inconsistencies in the
law regarding gender-based classifications).
17. See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2287-91 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (arguing that
the Court needlessly clouded the issue by applying a nek standard unsupported by
precedent); id. at 2293-96 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (same); see also infra Section IV and
accompanying text (analyzing the Virginia decision).
18. See iftra notes 23-156 and accompanying text.
19. See infta notes 157-84 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 185-322 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 323-61 and accompanying text.
22. See ifrua notes 362-67 and accompanying text
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
24. See John Galotto, Note, Strict Scrutiny for Gender, Via Croson, 93 COLuM. L
REV. 508, 510-11 (1993). The thirty-ninth Congress passed the Reconstruction Amend-
ments, U.S. CONsT. amends. XIII, XIV, XV, in conjunction with the 1866 Freedmen's
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Court recast the Equal Protection Clause early this century when it
applied the clause to nonracial classifications." Many scholars now
believe it to be the greatest protector of individual rights.28
Ironically, as the Equal Protection Clause secured a prominent role in
Constitutional jurisprudence, the Court's choice of interpretation meth-
odology grew increasingly erratic.27 In general, to satisfy equal protec-
tion scrutiny, the Court has required a sufficient relationship between a
classification and the purpose for which the government designed the
classification. 8 The Court analyzes the exact degree of relationship
required under different standards of scrutiny, depending on the nature
of the classification.' The appropriate level of scrutiny for varying
types of classifications has been the subject of great controversy. 3' Not
only has the proper scrutiny due each type of classification been at is-
sue, but the vigor with which the Court should apply each standard has
been difficult to settle and, at times, bewildering.31 The Supreme Court
has changed the level of scrutiny and vigor of application within each
level many times, and holdings have been particularly inconsistent with
respect to gender-based equal protection claims.'
Bureau Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, just after the end of the Civil War.
Galotto, supra, at 510 n.10. Most historians agree that Congress designed the Amend-
ments solely to protect the rights of the freed slaves by placing the constitutionality
of these two acts beyond doubt. Id. In the Slaughter-House Cases, which discussed
the Reconstruction Amendments, Supreme Court Justice Miller wrote, "We doubt very
much whether any action of a State not directed by way of discrimination against
the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to come within
[the Equal Protection Clause's] purview.... In re Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873).
25. Galotto, supra note 24, at 512.
26. JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrTUTONAL LAW § 14.1, at 595 (5th
ed. 1995).
27. See infr notes 65-152 and accompanying text.
28. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
29. NOWAK & ROTuNDA, supra note 26, § 14.3, at 600-01.
30. See George C. -lavac, Interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause: A Consti-
tutional Shell Game, 61 GEo. WASH. L REv. 1349, 1350 (1993).
31. See id. at 1349-50 (comparing the Court's Equal Protection analysis to a shell
game and stating that "the individual Justices have been unable to agree under which
shell to place the ball").
32. See id. at 1363-70. Compare Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718, 724-26 (1982) (applying intermediate scrutiny review to a gender-based classifi-
cation system) with Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (applying intermediate
scrutiny to a gender-based classification), with Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,
682-84, 688 (1973) (applying strict scrutiny to a gender classification), with Reed, 404
U.S. at 76 (applying rational basis scrutiny "with bite" to a gender classification and
thus using a standard more similar to an intermediate scrutiny). For a discussion of
the history of gender-based classifications in the equal protection analysis, see invfa
notes 65-112 and accompanying text
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A. The Standards of Review
The appropriate level of scrutiny hinges on a legal categorization of
the challenged state action, and "this threshold determination often
decides the case: for each level of scrutiny there is a well-settled mode
of analysis that often foreordains particular results."' Consequently,
for as much conflict that the Court creates by its determination of the
applicable level of scrutiny, the Court creates an equal amount of con-
troversy in its application of the standard.' The Court refers to the
scrutiny levels with varying terminology, but has essentially developed
three: rational basis scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scruti-
ny.
35
1. Rational Basis Scrutiny
Rational basis scrutiny defers assessment of legislative means and
ends to the legislative branches.' Within "this area the Justices have
determined that they have no unique function to perform," and so the
application of the rational basis test has become almost a rubber stamp
of approval. 7 A gender classification will survive this level if a court
can find a rational basis between the legislation and a legitimate gov-
33. Galotto, supra note 24, at 509. Intermediate scrutiny is the clear exception to
this rule. See infta notes 65-112 and accompanying text (analyzing history and appli-
cation of intermediate scrutiny).
34. Compare United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct 2264 (1995) (applying new "ex-
ceedingly persuasive justification standard" to gender classifications), with id. at 2288
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (arguing for intermediate scrutiny standard), and id. at
2291-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing for intermediate scrutiny); Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct 2097 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to a benign
racial classification), with id. at 2120 nl1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that the
Court should distinguish between invidious and benign discrimination and apply differ-
ent levels of scrutiny to each); Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62 (1990) (apply-
ing strict scrutiny to strike down patronage-based employment practices as violative
of the First Amendment's right of political association), with id at 2746-52 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing for a "not so clear" standard such as the intermediate "reason-
ableness" standard); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989)
(applying strict scrutiny to a benign racial minority set-aside program), with id at
535 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should analyze benign racial set
aside provision under a lower level of scrutiny); Hogan, 458 U.S. at 718 (applying
intermediate scrutiny to gender classification), with id. at 733-41 (Powell, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing for rational basis).
35. NOWAK & RoTuNDA, supra note 26, § 14.3, at 600-06.
36. Id, § 14.3, at 601, 606-09.
37. Id § 14.3, at 601.
1357
ernment objective." Until the early 1970s, the Supreme Court applied
rational basis scrutiny to gender classification cases and routinely up-
held discriminatory laws as rationally related to the legitimate govern-
ment objective of preserving the traditional social roles of men and
women.3
2. Strict Scrutiny
While rational basis scrutiny gives the utmost deference to legislative
will, strict scrutiny brings intense judicial examination into the relation-
ship between a classification and its purported government objective."
With strict scrutiny, the Court does not accept every government pur-
pose as sufficient, but requires the government to produce a compelling
or overriding end to justify the classification.' Even if the state shows
a compelling interest, the Court will uphold the classification only if the
classification is narrowly tailored, essential, and sufficiently related to
the compelling end it serves.42 Thus, while strict scrutiny is not "'fatal
in fact,'" it is unavoidably fatal in most applications.
43
Strict scrutiny's austerity was no mistake. The Court conceived the
standard to protect "fundamental rights" and certain "discrete and
insular minorities."45 A government classification found to carve out a
discrete and insular minority is "inherently suspect" and automatically
given strict scrutiny.' Originally, the Court held only discrimination
against African Americans was inherently suspect.47 The Court expand-
ed this category to include other ethnic groups, and now the inherently
suspect category includes all racial classification scenarios.' Further
38. Id.
39. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrUIONAL LAW § 16-25, at 1560-61 (2d ed.
1988) (citing Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961)). In Hoyt, the Warren Court unani-
mously approved, despite the "enlightened emancipation of women," a state law that
included men on the jury list unless they requested an exemption, but exempted
women unless they volunteered, because "wom[en] (were] still regarded as the center
of home and family life." Id. at 1561 (quoting Hoyt, 368 U.S. at 61-62).
40. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, upra note 26, § 14.3, at 601-02.
41. Id. § 14.3, at 602.
42. Id.
43. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2117 (1995) (quoting
Fullilove v. Klutznic, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980)).
44. NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 26, § 14.3, at 602.
45. Hlavac, supra note 30, at 1378 n.190. Suspect classifications are those based
on "invidious prejudgment, grounded in notions of superiority and inferiority, in be-
liefs about relative worth, [and] attitudes that deny the premise of human equality."
Id. at 1379 (citing Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L REV. 197,
201-02 (1976)).
46. NowAK & RoTuNDA, supra note 26, § 14.3, at 602.
47. Galotto, supra note 24, at 511.
48. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113 (holding all racial classifications, including federal
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advancing its value, the Court has even applied strict scrutiny to non-
racial classifications. 9 Women's rights advocates have continuously
petitioned for strict scrutiny of gender-based classifications' and, true
to its unpredictable nature within this area of law, the Court agreed
with them on one occasion."' In Virginia, The Attorney General also
believed gender classifications worthy of the "inherently suspect" label
and argued that strict scrutiny was the proper standard with which to
evaluate VM's admissions policy. 2
3. Intermediate Scrutiny
Until the 1970s, an author could write an article on equal protection
and profile only rational basis and strict scrutiny.' The polarity of
these two standards virtually predestined that once confronted with a
classification which did not fit into its limited framework, the Court
would have to fashion another standard.' For cases falling in the mid-
dle, intermediate scrutiny became the final tier.55
Intermediate scrutiny grants less deference to legislative will than
rational basis but is less difficult for governments to satisfy than strict
scrutiny.' The exact terminology changes from case to case, but under
affirmative action programs, must meet strict scrutiny).
49. Id. at 2117. Other inherently suspect classifications are those based on alienage
or national origin. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 26, § 14.3, at 602.
50. See infra notes 74-156 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court cases
in which women's groups advocated for the use of strict scrutiny).
51. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682-84, 688 (1973); see also ifma
notes 87-95 and accompanying text (discussing the Prontiero decision)
52. Brief for Petitioner at 20-49, Virginia (No. 94-1941).
53. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 26, § 14.3, at 602-03.
54. Justice Marshall argued that an equal protection framework with only the two
extremes of rational basis and strict scrutiny was untenable in his dissents to San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez and Dandridge v. Williams. See
Antonio, 411 U.S. 1, 70-133 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Dandridge, 397 U.S. 471,
508-30 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
55. Although the Court first openly adopted intermediate scrutiny in Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), the Supreme Court
withdrew from its "posture of utmost deference to political judgments respecting the
role of women." TaIBE, supra note 39, at 1561. Reed can be viewed as a rationality
with bite" case or "[a]lternatively. ... as a struggle [by Justice Burger] to avoid
having to refine the equal protection doctrine (by applying intermediate scrutiny) or
having to define clearly the existing doctrine (by applying strict scrutiny outside the
context of race)." Galotto, supra note 24, at 520.
56. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 26, § 14.3, at 603.
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intermediate scrutiny, when the government seeks to uphold a classifi-
cation, it must, as with rational basis and strict scrutiny, justify the
classification."7 Facially, this involves a two prong test: first, the clas-
sification must serve an important government objective, and second,
the classification must be substantially related to the achievement of
that objective.' The Court consistently directs that the government
objective not reflect invidious, archaic, overbroad, or stereotypic no-
tions.' This directive offers guidance to government actors; objectives
based on stereotypes are not "important" and fail the first inquiry."
The Court's directive carries great weight, and in practice "the Court
has continued to show little tolerance for legislative classifications that
presume women have no responsibilities outside the home.""
The Court designed intermediate scrutiny in and for gender classifica.-
tion cases,' but its use has spread to other areas of constitutional
analysis.' It remains most extensively used, however, in the equal pro.
tection arena where, until Virginia, it provided government actors with
a fairly consistent legal standard on which to base their conduct.'
B. Historic Application of the Standards
1. Gender Classifications
Gender classification equal protection jurisprudence has been incon-
sistent enough to provoke scholars and Supreme Court Justices to refer
to it as "diaphinous,"" a "shell game,"' and even the product of a
57. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982); Craig, 42)
U.S. at 197.
58. See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724; Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
59. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex re. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1422 (1994) (holding that the
state's intentional discrimination based on gender in use of peremptory strikes violat-
ed the Equal Protection Clause): In J.E.B., the Court wrote that the "Equal Protection
Clause . . . acknowledges that a shred of truth may be contained in some stereo-
types, but requires that state actors look beyond the surface before making judg-
ments." Id. at 1427 n.11.
60. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724-25.
61. TPIE, supra note 39, § 16-26, at 1564.
62. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197-99.
63. NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 26, § 14.3, at 603 (citing Metro Broad., Inc. v.
FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (holding that the Court would use the intermediate standard
when reviewing racial classifications described as "benign" or "affirmative action" in
federal legislation), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097
(1995)). The Court may have used the' intermediate standard in an "undocumented
children" alienage case, but the opinion does not clearly state the exact standard
used. Id. § 14.3, at 603 (discussing Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)).
64. Id. § 14.3, at 788.
65. Craig, 429 U.S. at 221 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist scorned
both the new intermediate scrutiny standard and the majority's method of establishing
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"magician's school." 7 Prior to 1971 the law was simple: the Court ap-
plied rational basis scrutiny to gender classifications and accepted dis-
crimination as an unfortunate byproduct of man's natural role as
woman's benevolent protector and defender.'
For example, in Goesaert v. Cleary' a Michigan law provided that
the State would not license a woman to tend bar unless she was the
wife or daughter of the male bar owner.7 Michigan asserted that the
purpose of the classification was to avoid the "social and moral prob-
lems" that it believed accompanied unsupervised female bartenders.7"
Characteristic of its broad deference under the rational basis standard,
the Supreme Court followed a mountain of precedent and determined
that Michigan's classification was rationally related to the State's pur-
pose.' In its decision to uphold the discriminating law, the Court
made a telling observation when it noted that "[t]he Constitution does
not require legislatures to reflect sociological insight, or shifting social
standards."3
Twenty-three years after Goesaert, the Burger Court began to drift
away from rational basis scrutiny in Reed v. Reed.74 In Reed, the Court
it. Id. at 217-28 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist was concerned that the
Court's new intermediate scrutiny standard invited the use of "subjective judicial pref-
erences or prejudices relating to ... legislation, masquerading as judgments." Id. at
221 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See infra notes 99-111 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the controversy surrounding intermediate scrutiny's creation.
66. Hlavac, supra note 30, at 1349-50.
67. Id at 1379.
68. TRIBE, supra note 39, § 16-25, at 1560. See, e.g, Hoyt v. Flonda, 368 U.S. 57
(1961) (upholding state statute which deemed males eligible for jury duty unless they
requested an exemption, but granted females an exemption unless they waived it be-
cause society viewed women as the center of the home and family life); Goesaert v.
Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding a state statute limiting women's ability to
bartend), overrued by Craig, 429 U.S. at 190.
69. 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
70. Id. at 465.
71. Id. at 466.
72. See id, at 467.
73. See id. at 466. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court, also noted.
We are, to be sure, dealing with a historic calling. We meet the alewife,
sprightly and ribald, in Shakespeare, but centuries before him she played a
role in the social life of England. The Fourteenth Amendment did not tear
history up by the roots .... Michigan could, beyond question, forbid all
women from working behind a bar.
Id, at 465 (citations omitted).
74. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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subjected an Idaho statute favoring men over women as estate adminis-
trators to rational basis scrutiny.75 The Court found that "clearly, the
objective of reducing workload on probate courts... [was] not without
some legitimacy."76 With Goesaert as guiding precedent, this objective
had a rational basis in reason and consequently should have been val-
id." The Director of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
Women's Rights Project, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, disagreed.'8 She argued
in an ACLU amicus brief that this purpose was not enough to justify
gender discrimination.' Ginsburg advocated gender as a suspect clas-
sification and urged the Court to apply strict scrutiny.' The Supreme
Court did not adopt the ACLU argument but made a surprising
move-it slightly elevated rational basis scrutiny."' The Court held
Idaho's purpose for the gender classification-"merely to accomplish
the elimination of hearings on the merits"-to be irrational.' With no
rational basis in reason, the Court struck down the statute as uncon-
stitutionally violative of equal protection.' The outcome perplexed
Idaho's lawyers because the Court had recently upheld similar classifi-
cations as entirely rational.' Further, the Reed opinion candidly stated
rational basis as the applicable standard, and Idaho had provided
one.' Idaho had no reason to be upset with its lawyers, for they had
not misread the law-the Supreme Court had changed it. Reed gave ra-
tional basis scrutiny some bite, and unlike in prior cases, "any old ratio-
nal basis" was not enough.'
75. Id. at 73.
76. Id. at 76.
77. See Goesaert, 335 U.S. at 465-67.
78. Deborah L Markowitz, In Pursuit of Equality: One Woman's Work to Change
the Law, 14 WOMEN'S RTs. L REP. 335, 337 (1992).
79. Collin O'Connor Udell, Signaling a New Direction in Gender Classification
Scrutiny: United States v. Virginia, 29 CONN. L REV. 521, 525 (1996).
80. Id.
81. See Reed, 404 U.S. at 76; Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (as-
serting that Reed notched the standard up to strict scrutiny); see also NOWAK & RO-
TUNDA, supra note 26, § 14.22, at 778-79.
82. Reed, 404 U.S. at 76-77.
83. Id. at 75-77.
84. See supra note 68. On the other hand, the composition of the Court changed
substantially in the years just before Reed because of Richard Nixon's appointment of
four Justices to the Supreme Court: Chief Justice Burger replaced Chief Justice War-
ren in 1969, Justice Powell replaced Justice Black in 1972, Justice Blackmun replaced
Justice Fortes in 1970, and Justice Rehnquist replaced Justice Harlan in 1972. GERALD
GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, app. A (10th ed. 1981).
85. Reed, 404 U.S. at 76.
86. See id. at 75-77. "A classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must
rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated
alike.'" Id. at 76 (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
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The Court's creativity in Reed was tame in contrast to what followed.
Equal protection analysis "took a strange turn"87 with Frontiero v.
Richardson.' The Frontiero case involved a challenge to an adminis-
trative armed forces rule requiring servicewomen, but not servicemen,
to affirmatively show that their dependents were actually dependent in
order to qualify for certain benefits.' A female Air Force lieutenant
challenged the rule, and again Ruth Bader Ginsburg found her way into
the fray.' Ginsburg authored another ACLU amicus brief pushing for
strict scrutiny." The resulting Frontiero plurality opinion, authored by
Justice Brennan, remains to date the high water mark of gender classifi-
cation scrutiny.92 Justice Brennan ungracefully propelled gender classi-
fication scrutiny straight to the top and baffled many by stating that the
Court had applied strict scrutiny in Reed.9' Justice Brennan wrote that
gender was an "inherently suspect" class and required the imposition of
strict scrutiny because "sex, like race and national origin, is an immuta-
ble characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth."' Justice
Brennan looked squarely to Reed as precedent for his assertion, con-
cluding that Reed's "stringent analysis" was a clear departure from ratio-
nal basis scrutiny and offered "at least implicit support" for strict scruti-
ny of gender classifications.'
In the wake of Frontiero's puzzling twist, the Court struggled to find
the proper scrutiny standard for gender-based classifications.' In a
five-year period, the Court provided little guidance for lower courts and
government actors by careening between the equal protection extremes
of rational basis and strict scrutiny." Fortunately, only one year after
87. Hlavac, supra note 30, at 1364.
88. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
89. Id. at 678.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See id, at 677; see also Hiavac, supra note 30, at 1364-65.
93. See Hlavac, supra note 30, at 1365 (labeling Justice Brennan's conclusion "ex-
traordinarily puzzling").
94. F ontiem, 411 U.S. at 686.
95. Id. at 682. Justice Powell, author of the Reed opinion, rejected the idea of
characterizing gender as an inherently suspect classification and stated that Reed "did
not add sex to the limited group of classifications which are inherently suspect." Id.
at 691-92 (Powell, J., concurring).
96. See, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522 (1975); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
97. See supra notes 65-95 and accompanying text (discussing cases spanning this
five-year period).
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Frontiero, a case arising out of the disparate drinking habits of
Oklahoma's young men and women presented the Court with a chance
to remedy its inconsistency.'
The Court lived up to the task and supplied some stability to gender
classification jurisprudence with Craig v. Boren.' The case began
when a man between eighteen and twenty-one years old, Craig, and a
beer vendor, Whitener, challenged an Oklahoma statute that prohibited
the sale of 3.2% beer to males under the age of twenty-one but to fe-
males under the age of eighteen."° Ruth Bader Ginsburg agreed with
Craig and Whitener and submitted an ACLU amicus brief in support of
their challenge.°' They won."
The scrutiny level applied in Craig was not due to a respite in the
otherwise turbulent waters of Court logic; if anything, the 1976 decision
was the apex of its ingenuty."° The Craig Court pointed to both Reed
and Frontiero to support its vague conclusion that gender classifica-
tions were "subject to scrutiny."'" The logic behind this ambiguous
conclusion was as mysterious as the decision itself. The Court reasoned
that "previous cases" had established a standard whereby the govern-
ment must show that a gender classification (1) serves an important
governmental objective, and (2) is substantially related to that objec-
tive.1 5
Although Craig purported to apply the standard used in previous
cases, it actually furnished a new standard."° In his dissent, Justice
Rehnquist labeled the new level "intermediate" scrutiny, and outlined
his displeasure with the standard."° First, Justice Rehnquist criticized
the majority's decision to insert another level of review between two
with which the Court already "had enough difficulty."" Further, Jus-
98. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). According to statistical evidence, police
arrested only .1896 of females, but 2% of males, between the ages of 18 and 20 for
drunk driving. Id. at 201.
99. See id. at 190.
100. Id.
101. Id, at 191 n.*.
102. Id. at 210.
103. Once again, Justice Brennan disregarded his own precedent and authored the
Court's change of direction. See id. at 191. Justice Rehnquist dissented, writing that
"[tlhe only redeeming feature of the (Craig] opinion . . . is that it apparently signals
a retreat by those who joined the plurality opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson." Id..
at 217 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 197.
105. Id. at 197-98; see also Hlavac, supra note 30, at 1370-71.
106. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 220-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); NOwAX & ROTuNDA,
supra note 26, § 14.22, at 782.
107. Craig, 429 U.S. at 217-28 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 220-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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tice Rehnquist correctly pointed out that the Court enunciated its new
intermediate standard "without citation to any source."" 9 Despite the
fact that intermediate scrutiny rested on noticeably uncited cases, or
more accurately came out of "thin air,""' the standard provided legal
consistency for future gender discrimination equal protection claims:
the Court facially followed Craig as guiding precedent for over two
decades."'
Craig settled the verbal formula, but the diverse holdings in interme-
diate scrutiny decisions since Craig reflect a continued ad hoc na-
ture."2 Results depend largely on the circumstances surrounding each
case and often turn on the majority's finding as to whether the govern-
ment based the classification on a sexual stereotype or truly intended
to promote a legitimate objective."3 This leaves the Court open to
criticism, and both the Justices and scholars often ridicule intermediate
scrutiny as a tool with which broad social policy emanates from an
active, outcome-driven judicial branch."4 Whatever the Supreme
Court's intent, it is clear that intermediate scrutiny is slightly height-
ened or slightly lowered depending on other circumstances surrounding
a case." ' A good example of this is in military affairs, where the Court
slightly lowers intermediate scrutiny and defers to Congress a greater
extent than pure application might allow."'
109. Id. at 217, 219-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
110. Id at 220 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
The Equal Protection Clause contains no such language, and none of our
previous cases adopt that standard. I would think we have had enough diffi-
culty with the two standards of review which our cases have recognized-the
norm of "rational basis," and the "compelling state interest" required where a
"suspect classification" is involved-so as to counsel weightily against the
insertion of still another "standard" between those two.
Id. at 220-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
111. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 26, § 14.23, at 782; Hlavac, supra note 30, at
1370-71. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981); Wengler v. Druggists Mut.
Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
112. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 26, § 14.23, at 782-88.
113. Id. § 14.23, at 782.
114. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2292-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(asserting that the Virginia decision was not law, but "politics-smuggled-into-law");
see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 26, § 14.23, at 782 (stating that "the Court's
decisions appear to be ad hoc judgments based upon Justices' perceptions of the
gender classification at issue in each case").
115. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 26, § 14.23, at 782-88.
116. Id. § 14.23, at 786-87.
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However pliant the exact degree of intermediate scrutiny in certain
circumstances, it is important to remember that since Craig v. Boren,
the Court has formally employed intermediate scrutiny as the proper
standard of review for gender classification equal protection claims."7
2. Gender Classifications in a Military Context
As in most military matters, when gender discrimination is alleged in
military affairs the Supreme Court shows great deference to Congress
and curtails its application of intermediate scrutiny."' In Rostker v.
Goldberg,"9 several men subject to the military draft challenged the
Selective Service Act's male-only registration policy.2 ' Applying
Craig's standard, the majority reasoned that draft registration plans
substantially related to the important objective of maintaining an inven-
tory of available personnel for combat in the event of a military emer-
gency.'2' Because women did not serve in combat positions, registra-
tion of women was not necessary.'22 Justice Rehnquist's opinion
stressed the importance of national defense, noting that "in no other
area has the Court accorded Congress greater deference. " " Even this
has not satisfied Congress, however, which continually requests the
Court to apply rational basis scrutiny to matters of national defense in
order to broaden legislative power over national security.I
4
Nonetheless, intermediate scrutiny endures, and the Court will not al-
low Congress to draw any gender classification it wishes simply be-
cause national defense is a factor in the Court's analysis."2 The im-
117. Id. § 14.23, at 782; Laurie A. Keco, Note, The Citade" Last Male Bastion or
New Training Ground?, 46 CASE W. RES. L REV. 479, 495 (1996). But see Hlavac,
supra note 30, at 1374-79 (arguing that the proper test is rational basis scrutiny, not
intermediate scrutiny).
118. See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 26, § 14.23, at 786-87.
119. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
120. Id. at 61-63.
121. Id. at 75-76, 83.
122. Id. at 76. The issue of whether women should serve in combat was not ad-
dressed by the majority opinion. Accepting the exclusion of women from combat as
proper, the Court asked if the policy of excluding women from registration was
.closely related" to the objective of national defense. Id. at 76-79.
123. Id. at 64-65.
The, customary deference accorded the judgments of Congress is certainly ap-
propriate when, as here, Congress specifically considered the question of the
Act's constitutionality .... This is not, however, merely a case involving the
customary deference accorded congressional decisions. The case arises in the
context of Congress' authority over national defense and military affairs, and
perhaps in no other area has the Court accorded Congress greater deference.
Id.
124. See, e.g., id. at 57 (1981); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
125. See Lucille M. Ponte, Waldie Answered: Equal Protection and the Admissions
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port of the objective affects the application, but Craig's intermediate
scrutiny standard survives largely intact.
126
3. Gender Classifications and State Supported Education
Since Craig, the Court has consistently applied intermediate scrutiny
in education cases but, as one should expect, the results deserve mixed
reviews for consistency. 27 Mississippi University for Women v.
Hogan'" presented the Court with the chance to rule on single-gender
public education fourteen years before the Court addressed Virginia.
Hogan involved Mississippi University for Women (MUW), a state-sup-
ported university that accepted only women." A prospective student
challenged the policy after the school denied him entry to MUW's
School of Nursing solely because he was male."3 Mississippi justified
the single-gender admissions policy on the basis that it compensated for
past discrimination against women. 3 ' The exclusion of women from
one institution, asserted Mississippi, was "valid as 'educational affirma-
tive action.'" "n A majority of the Supreme Court disagreed."
Hogan shared an important feature with Craig which the Court made
a point to mention: although Mississippi discriminated against men and
not women, this did not affect the intermediate scrutiny analysis.' 3
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion began with a reflection on the
proper scrutiny standard: MUW's gender discrimination required an
"exceedingly persuasive justiflication.""3 The Court had not used this
of Women to Military Colleges and Academies, 25 NEW ENG. L REV. 1137, 1147-51
(1991).
126. Ponte concluded that despite the high deference given to Congress over mili-
tary affairs, the Court maintains that it generally applies intermediate scrutiny to
gender-based classifications in the military context Id. at 1153.
127. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex
rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct 1419 (1994); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718
(1982); Faulkner v. Jones, 51 F.3d 440, 444 (4th Cir. 1995).
128. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
129. Id. at 719-20.
130. Id. at 720-21.
131. Id. at 727.
132. Id. & n.13 ("In its reply brief, the state understandably retreated from its con-
tention that MUW was founded to provide opportunities for women which were not
available to men.").
133. Id, at 731.
134. See id. at 723.
135. Id. at 724 (citing Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981); Personnel
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phrase in Craig," but nevertheless, Justice O'Connor applied the two-
prong intermediate scrutiny test just as in Craig.'37 Indeed, the
opinion's initial call for an exceedingly persuasive justification had no
effect on the substantive legal analysis beyond requiring an inquiry into
Mississippi's true purpose, and most Court observers looked past it. 3
At most, the Court recognized the phrase as a shorthand referral to
intermediate scrutiny.3 9
The Hogan majority subjected one of Mississippi's offered objec-
tives-to provide its female citizens with a choice of educational envi-
ronments-to a brief, but traditional, Craig analysis. 4 ' Justice
O'Connor disposed of this objective in a footnote, stating that it begged
the question because "[t]he issue is not whether the benefited class
profits from the classification, but whether the State's decision to con-
fer a benefit only upon one class by means of a discriminatory classifi-
cation is substantially related to achieving a legitimate and substantial
goal."
141
Mississippi's other important objective of compensating women for
past discrimination warranted particular attention from Justice
O'Connor.44 This objective, she determined, was not an actual objec-
tive but a hollow rationalization."4 First, Mississippi provided no evi-
Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979)). As though the Court' was not changing
the intermediate scrutiny analysis at all, the very next sentence recites the exact test
outlined in Craig: "The burden is met only by showing at least that the classification
serves 'important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory mearn
employed' are 'substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.'" Hogan,
458 U.S. at 724 (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)).
136. The Court did require an exceedingly persuasive justification in Personnel Ad-
ministrator v. Feeney and Kirchberg v. Feenstra. In each case, the Court used the
phrase "exceedingly persuasive justification" to reflect the difficulty of meeting inter-
mediate scrutiny. See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 273 (upholding state law giving employment
preference to military veterans, 9896 of whom were men); Kirchberg, 450 U.S. at 461
(striking down statute which gave husbands but not wives the power to sell proper-
ty).
137. See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724-34.
138. See, e.g., NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 26, § 14.23, at 787 (stating that "[t]he
majority opinion, like those since 1976, stated that the classification would only be
upheld if it served important governmental objectives and if the classification was
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives"). Nowak and Rotunda
published their treatise before the Virginia decision and, although they gave an ex-
tensive review of Hogan, they did not mention the phrase "exceedingly persuasive
justification." See id. § 14.23, at 787-88.
139. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2288 (Rehnquist, C.J., concur-
ring); id. at 2294-96 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
140. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 731 n.17.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 727-31.
143. Id. at 730.
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dence that its true purpose was to compensate women for past
harms.'" To the contrary, the record showed that Mississippi was not
at all concerned with remedying past harms to women.' Second,
nursing was a traditionally female occupation and there was no past
harm in the nursing field to remedy.4' "Rather than compensate for
discriminatory barriers faced by women, MUW's policy of excluding
males from admission to the School of Nursing tend[ed] to perpetuate
the stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively woman's job.""7 Not
only was the offered purpose not the true government interest, but the
classification did not, and could not, advance that interest." Justice
O'Connor cast aside this objective as a sham and put government actors
on notice: to defend a gender classification, the offered purpose must
144. Id. at 729-31.
145. Id, at 731.
146. Id. at 729-30. The decision left open the possibility of whether MUW could ad-
dress past harms done to women in other areas such as engineering, law, and medi-
cine through a valid affirmative action program. Id.
147. Id. at 729.
148. Id. at 729-30. The Supreme Court had, on two occasions prior to Hogan, found
an offered purpose illegitimate because the discriminatory classification did not ad-
vance the offered purpose. In Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, the Court struck down a
portion of the Social Security Act which granted benefits based on a deceased hus-
band and father's earnings to his widow and minor children while granting payments
based on a deceased wife and mother's earnings only to her minor children and not
to her widower. Weinberger, 420 U.S. 636, 638-39 (1975). The Social Security Adminis-
tration argued Congress's purpose behind this classification was to compensate wom-
en for past economic harms. Id. at 648. The Court found this objective unauthentic,
pointing to the fact that the benefits ceased when the widow's children reached ma-
turity. Id. at 648-53. The Court questioned how this system could compensate women
for past harm, when the very women who had spent years at home with their chil-
dren would no longer receive the benefits of the law after their children reached the
age of majority. Id. Because the classification did not advance the stated purpose,
the Court found it a mere rationalization. Id. The Court likewise struck down a gen-
der classification statute in Califano v. Gokdfarb after determining that the classifica-
tion did not advance the government's offered objective. Califano, 430 U.S. 199, 202
(1977). In Califano, another Social Security Act provision granted benefits to widows
automatically, but only to widowers who could prove dependency on their wives' in-
come. Id. at 201. The Court found the classification "completely unadvanced" the
government's stated purpose of looking after the social needs of widows and widow-
ers. Id. at 202. It was simply irrational, wrote Justice Stevens, that the law advan-
taged women who had gained employment and independence but denied dependent
men benefits. Id. at 221-22 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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be authentic.'49 That is, the offered purpose must be advanced by the
classification and be the true purpose behind the classification."w
Hogan did not completely settle the single-gender education issue.
The Court was able to avoid the question of separate but equal institu-
tions because Mississippi had not established a male-only nursing
school.' The Court also dodged an important issue that many educa-
tors wanted resolved-namely, the legitimacy of single-gender educa-
tion in general; a footnote limited the Court's decision to the unique
facts of the case."2
Although the opinion lacked a much desired broad rule, Hogan's
reliance on intermediate scrutiny made it surprisingly clear to scholars
and lower courts that after sporadic maneuvering among three levels of
scrutiny the Supreme Court had firmly placed gender in the middle.'53
In the case of Virginia, the fact that VMI's stated objective might fall
into the military context was of little importance because intermediate
149. See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 723-31.
150. See id. at 731.
151. See id. at 718-33.
152. Id at 723 n.7 ("[W]e decline to address the question of whether [the
University's] admissions policy, as applied to males seeking admission to schools
other than the School of Nursing, violates the Fourteenth Amendment."). The four
dissenting Justices were concerned that the precedent would nevertheless lead tW
broad interpretation. Id. at 733-46. Justice Blackmun stated, "I hope that we do not
lose all values that some think are worthwhile (and are not based on differences of
race or religion) and regulate ourselves to needless conformity." Id. at 734-35
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
153. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 26, § 14.23, at 787 (concluding that the adop-
tion of the substantial relationship to an important government interest standard by a
majority of Justices settled, at least formally, the issue of the proper definition of a
middle level standard of review for gender classifications); Keco, supra note 117, at
500 (asserting that Hogan finalized intermediate scrutiny as the standard of analysis
for equal protection violations based on gender); Ponte, supra note 125, at 1160
(concluding that the Rostker case affirmed the acceptance of intermediate scrutiny for
reviewing gender discrimination equal protection claims in the military context); see,
e.g., Faulkner v. Jones, 51 F.3d 440, 444 (4th Cir. 1995) (utilizing intermediate scruti-
ny to determine if a publicly-funded, male-only military institute violated equal protec-
tion); United States v. Virginia, (VMI 1), 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding
Virginia's maintenance of a male-only admissions policy at Virginia Military Institute
without the provision of a comparable opportunity for women was not justified by a
state policy of providing diversity in education and thus violated of equal protection),
affd, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996); United States v. Virginia, (VMI I1), 44 F.3d 1229 (4th
Cir. 1995) (applying a special intermediate scrutiny test designed to analyze a state's
provision of single-gender education, and holding that Virginia's plan of providing
singie-gender education was not a pernicious state objective and, thus, not violative
of the Equal Protection Clause), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
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scrutiny prevailed even in gender discrimination cases directly involving
the armed forces."5
With three well-developed scrutiny levels, the Court had created a
predictable framework with which to evaluate classifications. Addition-
ally, by using the intermediate level, it was not difficult for the Court to
justify a ruling based on its gut instinct."5 This inherent flexibility
made the constitutionality of VMI and The Citadel, the only two single-
gender military schools in the nation, highly uncertain and susceptible
to an ad hoc decision. Nevertheless, an important issue was well-set-
tled: if a woman challenged VMI's male-only policy as violative of equal
protection, the Court would resolve the case under the Craig and Ho-
gan line of precedent."
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Supreme Court confronted two issues in Virginia. First, the
constitutional validity of excluding women from the unique educational
opportunity of a state-supported military academy, and second, the
proper remedy if exclusion was unconstitutional."57 VMI was an all-
male, state-supported college using an "adversative" training method in
its mission to produce citizen-soldiers."S At the time of the case, VMI
boasted the largest per-student endowment of any public undergraduate
college in the nation and was widely recognized as an incomparable
military college having military generals, members of Congress, and
business executives among its alumni.' The adversative method used
by VMI to educate its cadets emphasized physical rigor, mental stress,
equality of treatment, absence of privacy, and minute regulation of
behavior." ° VMI was the only school in Virginia where a student could
154. See supra notes 118-26 and accompanying text (discussing armed forces cases).
155. See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text (discussing ad hoc nature of
decisions in intermediate level standard cases).
156. See supra note 153 .(setting forth various constitutional scholars' opinions on
the standard' of review in gender classification cases).
157. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2274.
158. Id. at 2269. The Court noted that only 15% of VMI cadets entered the military
as a career. Id. at 2270.
159. Id. at 2269.
160. Id. at 2270.
1371
receive this unique style of education,61 and it was the only single..
gender school among Virginia's fifteen public institutions of higher
learning."
In 1990, a female high school student interested in attending VMI
filed a complaint with the United States Attorney General." She re-
quested the office challenge VMI's all-male admissions policy."6 The
Attorney General filed suit against the Commonwealth of Virginia and
VMI, claiming that the policy violated the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause." The United States District Court for the
Western District of Virginia applied intermediate scrutiny and justified
VMI's policy." The district court found that single-gender education
provided substantial educational benefits. 67 Further, the district court
held that VMI's unique method of educating men created a "measure of
diversity" in Virginia's overall system of education."~ The only way for
Virginia to maintain the benefits of the single-gender environment, the
court concluded, was to exclude women."
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit also applied intermediate scrutiny, but
disagreed with the district court's conclusion.' The circuit court held
Virginia had a strong interest in providing its citizens with a diversified
system of education, but because Virginia offered the adversative ap-
proach only to men it violated the Equal Protection Clause.' The
Fourth Circuit's opinion, however, contained an interesting observation:
[Tihe district court was not clearly erroneous in concluding that if a court were to
require the admission of women to VMI to give them access to this unique meth-
odology, the decision would deny those women the very opportunity they sought
because the unique characteristics of VMH's program would be destroyed by coed-
ucation. The Catch-22 is that women are denied the opportunity when excluded
from VMlI and cannot be given the opportunity by admitting them, because the
change caused by their admission would destroy the opportunity.17
161. Id. at 2269.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 2271.
164. Id.
165. Id. From 1990 to 1992, VMI ignored 347 inquiries from women interested in at-
tending. Id.
166. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1410 (W.D. Va 1991), vacated, 976
F.24 890 (4th Cir. 1992), aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
167. Id. at 1415.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Virginia, 976 F.2d at 900.
171. Id. at 898-99 ("A policy of diversity which aims to provide an array of educa-
tional opportunities, including single-gender institutions, must do more than favor one
gender.").
172. Id. at 897 (citations omitted).
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In light of this "Catch-22" inherent in admitting women, the Fourth
Circuit remanded the district court's decision with instructions that Vir-
ginia "remedy" the violation.73 The court of appeals offered Virginia
three remedial suggestions: admit women, establish a parallel program
for women, or end state support of VMI.
174
Virginia chose the second option.171 It proposed the Virginia Women's
Institute for Leadership (VWIL) as a state-sponsored parallel program to
VMI and decided to locate the new institution at Mary Baldwin College, a
private women's college not far from VMI. 78 A "Task Force" of Mary
Baldwin College administrators, faculty, and students determined that the
VMI methodology was inappropriate for women.'" Instead of the adver-
sative approach, the Task Force recommended, and VWIL instituted, a
co-operative learning method featuring a Reserve Officer Training Corps
(ROTC) program, leadership courses, and student participation in the
Virginia Corps of Cadets. T" The Attorney General claimed the creation
of VWIL was not a valid remedy and again made a challenge in district
court, this time arguing that VWIL was not "sufficiently similar" to VMI
"in all respects."'" The district court, however, held for Virginia and
found VWIL to be a satisfactory remedy."s
The U.S. Attorney's Office appealed, and a divided Fourth Circuit panel
devised a "heightened intermediate scrutiny test specially tailored to the
circumstances" surrounding VMI.'8' In essence, the panel added a third
prong to the Craig intermediate scrutiny test: to pass constitutional mus-
ter, it required VWIL to be "substantively comparable" to VMI.' 8 Apply-
ing this new standard, the Fourth Circuit held VWIL to be inferior to VMI
in historical benefit and prestige but nevertheless substantively compara-
ble."8 The United States appealed, and the Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari."
173. Id. at 900.
174. Id.
175. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct 2264, 2272 (1996).
176. Id. at 2272. VWIL's mission also would be to produce "citizen soldiers." Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 2272-73.
179. United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471, 481 (W.D. Va 1994), qffd, 44 F.3d
1129 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. at 2264.
180. Id. at 485.
181. Virginia, 44 F.3d at 1229.
182. Id. at 1239-41.
183. Id. at 1240-41.
184. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 281, 282 (1995).
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION
A. Justice Ginsburg's Majority Opinion
1. Heightened Scrutiny
Justice Ginsburg wrote for herself and five other Justices.1" She be-
gan with a controversial statement- "The core instruction... [is that
p]arties who seek to defend gender-based government action must dem-
onstrate an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for that. action.""s
The phrase was not new, plucked from Justice O'Connor's Hogan opin-
ion, but had never been the core instruction."8 Justice Ginsburg gave
another signal that she was altering the long-followed Craig standard: "In
response to our nation's long and unfortunate history of sex discrimiat-
tion," she explained, gender classifications require a heightened standard
of review."s The Court had shorthandedly referred to intermediate
scrutiny as "heightened review" in other Supreme Court decisions, and
the phrase had always precluded a traditional Craig analysis." Howev-
185. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2269. Chief Justice Rehnquist filed a concurring opinion,
and Justice Scalia dissented. Id. Justice Thomas recused himself because his son was
a student at VMI at the time the Court heard the case. Linda Greenhouse, Legacy of
a Term, N.Y. TiMES, July 3, 1996, at Al.
186. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2274 (emphasis added). Justice Ginsburg cited J.E.B.i.
Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994), and Mississippi University for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982), as precedent supporting this standard. Virginia, 116 S.
Ct. at 2274. Although these opinions use this phrase, in neither opinion did the Cout
treat the phrase as a test unto itself; rather, the Court used it to introduce the inter-
mediate scrutiny test, immediately thereafter defining it as requiring the defender of a
gender classification to show that the classification was substantially related to the
achievement of an important governmental objective. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 136-37;
Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724. Indeed, between the two cases there were five separate dis-
sents and two concurring opinions-none of which took any notice of the phrase. See
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 146-63; Hogan,'458 U.S. at 733-46.
187. The first paragraph of the Court's legal analysis reads:
We note, once again, the core instruction of this Court's pathmarking deci-
sions in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B. and Mississippi University for
Women: Parties who seek to defend gender-based government action must
demonstrate an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for that action.
Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2274 (citations omitted). According to Justice Ginsburg's opin-
ion, Hogan and J.E.B. were the "pathmarking" decisions, and the instant decision
merely followed an already beaten path. Id, This is simply not true: United States 'v.
Virginia did the path beating. See infa notes 211-16, 23842, 263-67 and accompany-
ing text
188. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2274-75. Justice Ginsburg also referred to her analysis
as "skeptical scrutiny." Id. at 2274.
189. See, e.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 771 (1994);
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985).
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er, although Justice Ginsburg's intention was unclear, her use of the
phrase seemed to carry new meaning." No longer would the Court
read heightened review as shorthand, for it now required a standard
further heightened from intermediate scrutiny. Indeed, the opinion that
followed this murky introduction made clear that two simple phrases
which in the past served as shorthand for a consistent application of
intermediate scrutiny had come to mark a departure from that standard:
heightened review would now be a new heightened intermediate scruti-
ny.
19 1
Justice Ginsburg acknowledged that sex, unlike race, was not a pro-
scribed classification, but she implied that decisions following Reed had
skirted on the edge of strict scrutiny." The Court had not "equat[ed]
gender classifications, for all purposes, to classifications based on race
or national origin," but had carefully inspected state action that "close[d
a door or denie[d] an opportunity to women (or to men)."" These
close inspections, Justice Ginsburg reiterated, required that classifica-
tions based on gender have an exceedingly persuasive justification.'"
The burden is demanding, and "'[t]he State must show at least that the
[challenged] classification serves important governmental objectives and
that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives.'" 95 This was a hollow restatement of
Craig's principles, and the Court found little guidance in traditional inter-
190. Neither the Court nor scholars have settled on an exact name for the Craig v.
Boren test. Some opinions never name the test, but simply cite Craig and apply its
"substantially related to an important government objective" logic. See, e.g., Wengler
v. Druggist's Mut Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980). Many of the Justices and theo-
rists consistently use the term "intermediate scrutiny," see, e.g., NOWAK & ROTUNDA,
supra note 26, and for that reason this author chose the term for use in this Note.
Justice Ginsburg used the phrase "heightened scrutiny" in Virginia, and although
therein she may consider it synonymous with intermediate scrutiny, as used in this
Note, heightened scrutiny refers to Justice Ginsburg's peculiar application, or misap-
plication, of the Craig test
191. See supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text (discussing the intermediate scru-
tiny standard).
192. Virginia, 116 S. Ct at 2275.
193. Id.
194. Id. The Court described the standard of review just as it had in the past, but
the Court went out of its way to stress that, in fact, it requires the state to show an
"exceedingly persuasive justification." See, e.g., id. at 2274-76, 2287.
195. Id. at 2275 (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724
(1982) (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980) (internal
quotation marks omitted))).
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mediate scrutiny.1" Justice Ginsburg did address Virginia's two offered
objectives, but found one to be unauthentic and the other to fall "far
short" of the required exceedingly persuasive standard.'
2. Virginia's Objectives
Aware that the Court had analyzed gender classifications exclusively
under Craig for more than twenty years, Virginia offered two objectives
that the State claimed VMI's male-only policy admirably accorn-
plished.' First, Virginia asserted that a single-gender university was
vital to the State's attempt to provide diverse educational opportunities
for its citizens." The Court agreed that educational diversity did serve
the public good,2" but found it in this case to be a mere rationalization
for discrimination.2"' As in Hogan, the Court insisted that the proffered
objective be genuine and not hypothesized or invented post hoc in re-
sponse to litigation.2" The Court looked to the record and found only a
single document, the Report of the Virginia Commission on the Universi-
ty of the 21st Century, in which Virginia had declared educational diversi-
ty to be its true purpose.' The Court also delved into the history of
educational opportunity in Virginia and observed that the State had long
"deliberately" excluded women from higher education.2 Justice
Ginsburg criticized this historic lack of educational opportunity for worn-
en. For example, one of many elements in Virginia's constant plan to
provide for the State's sons but not her daughters was Virginia's premier
university, the University of Virginia, which did not allow female students
until 1970.' Each of the other state institutions had abandoned single-
gender education, leaving VMI as the only single-gender institution."
Relying on the record and her own history books, Justice Ginsburg found
"no persuasive evidence.., that VMI's male-only admission policy [wa]s
'in furtherance of a state policy of diversity.'2 7 With Hogan "immedi-
ately in point" as precedent, Justice Ginsburg reached "the same conclu-
196. See id. at 2276.
197. Id. at 2279, 2282.
198. Id. at 2276.
199. id.
200. Id, at 2277 ("It is not disputed that diversity among public educational insti-
tutions can serve the public good.").
201. Id. at 2279.
202. Id. at 2277.
203. Id. at 2278.
204. Id. at 2277-79.
205. Id. at 2278.
206. Id. at 2279.
207. Id (quoting United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 899 (4th Cir. 1992), offd,
116 S. Ct at 2264.
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sion" as Justice O'Connor-educational diversity was not the authentic
objective but a mere rationalization.2
Justice Ginsburg, however, had stretched precedent beyond its full
value. To begin, Hogan was not inuediately in point. In Hogan, the
Supreme Court found Mississippi's proffered objective to be a mere ratio-
nalization because it was not advanced by the gender classification
(there was no evidence of past discrimination against women in the field
of nursing requiring the remedy of maintaining an all-female nursing
school) and was not the true purpose behind the classification (Missis-
sippi had established MUW to provide white women with some source of
education).' In Virginia, however, the Court readily acknowledged
that the classification promoted Virginia's objective: "Single-sex educa-
tion affords pedagogical benefits to at least some students,... and that
reality is uncontested in this litigation.""' Nevertheless, because Vir-
ginia never stated "in the record" that its objective was to promote edu-
cational diversity, and because women in Virginia historically have been
denied educational opportunity, Justice Ginsburg found Virginia's objec-
tive disingenuous. 21' In contrast to cited precedent, Justice Ginsburg's
disposal of Virginia's proffered objective turned not on the proficiency of
the classification in meeting the objective, but on her deduction of
Virginia's true motive.212 The Court's Virginia decision directly contra-
208. Id. at 2279; see Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 731
(1982).
209. See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 727-31. In Hogan, Mississippi claimed that its primary
goal in maintaining MUW was "educational affirmative action." Id. at 727.
210. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2276-77.
211. Id, at 2279.
212. See id. at 2276-79; see also Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (striking
down a gender classification statute because the classification did not advance the
government's stated purpose of looking after the social needs of widows and widow-
ers); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (strildng down a gender discrimi-
natory statute because the classification did not advance the government's stated pur-
pose of compensating women for past economic harms; rather, the purpose was a
mere rationalization). In both Califano and Weinberger, the Court addressed rea-
sons--beyond the classifications' failure to advance the offered objective-to buttress
its decision that the government objective was not authentic; nevertheless, in both
cases the Court gave great weight to the fact that the classification did not advance
the stated objective. See Califano, 430 U.S. at 213-14; Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 651-53.
Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued both cases. Caitfano, 430 U.S. at 198; Weinberger, 420
U.S. at 637. For a thorough discussion of this aspect of Justice Ginsburg's opinion,
see Leading Cases, 110 HARv. L REV. 135, 181-85 (1996), which notes that "[als a
separate test, the rationalization inquiry threatens to transform the Supreme Court
into a 'council of revision,' bestowed with tremendous power to overturn legislation."
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dicted Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,213 which concluded that ab-
sent strict scrutiny, "there is simply no way of determining what classi-
fications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what classifications are in fact
motivated by illegitimate notions.... .2 4 Reading Adarand and Virgin-
ia, one could conclude the Court has realized that although it is unable
to ascertain using intermediate scrutiny the motivations behind racial
classifications, it is more adept at understanding when the motive behind
a gender classification is artificial.2"'
Justice Ginsburg addressed Virginia's second proffered objective-to
"achiev[e] the results of an adversative model"-with considerable di-
dain.16 She acknowledged that most women would not want to go to
VMI. 2 7 The district court had even accepted expert testimony and con-
cluded that most women would not prosper under the adversative
method.2"8 However, Justice Ginsburg found these factual findings to be
"fixed notions" of women's abilities and looked strictly to the fact that
some women had both the desire and ability to attend VMI.211 Virginia's
argument that admission of even these few women would destroy the
adversative system (and the school) was simply a "self-fulfilling
prophec[y]" based on the same ancient and familiar fears that once kept
women out of law, medicine, the military, and other professions.22 Pre-
dicting that women would fare as well at VMI as they had at the service
academies,22 Justice Ginsburg determined Virginia's objective to be
"'far short of establishing the "exceedingly persuasive justification" that
must be the solid base for any gender-defined classification. '" ' 2
3. The VWIL Remedy
"A remedial decree," Justice Ginsburg wrote, "must closely fit the con-
stitutional violation; it must be shaped to place persons unconstitutional-
ly denied an opportunity... in 'the position they would have occupied in
the absence of [discrimination].'" The remedy must eliminate the dis-
Id. at 183 (citations omitted).
213. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995),
214. Id. at 2112 (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)).
215. See Virginia, 116 S. Ct at 2279; Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2112.
216. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2279-82.
217. Id. at 2280.
218. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1434-35 (W.D. Va. 1991), vacated,
976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), qffd, 116 S. Ct. at 2264.
219. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2280.
220. Id. at 2279-81.
221. Id. at 2281 & n.13.
222. Id. at 2282 (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 731
(1982)) (internal citations omitted).
223. Id. (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977)) (internal quotation
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criminatory effects of the past to the extent practicable and prohibit
similar discrimination in the future.'
Virginia designed its remedy-the creation of VWIL-for those with the
desire and ability to attend VMI whom VMI could not admit because of
gender.' Virginia's decision not to adopt the VMI adversative model
(or at a minimum, a vigorous military training program) at VWIL failed to
provide women who desired such training with an adequate remedy for
their unconstitutional exclusion from VMI. 2 The fact that most women
would not want, and could not handle, the aggressive training at VMI did
not concern Justice Ginsburg. 7 She was not interested in what most
women wanted, instead writing that not only did most men not want to
attend VMI either, but generalizations about "the way women are" would
no longer justify discrimination.' In response to the argument that Vir-
ginia toned down VWIL because women rarely choose to pursue military
careers, Justice Ginsburg made a clever observation: "By that reasoning,
VMI's 'entirely militaristic' program would be inappropriate for men in
general or as a group, for '[olnly about 15% of VMI cadets enter career
military service. '" '
Justice Ginsburg's comparison of VMI's and VWIL's tangible features
revealed remarkably polar institutions.'a VMI greatly eclipsed VWIL in
all areas, including financing, faculty, library, and physical plant."2 '
VWIL was "'a pale shadow of VMI. ' "na Moreover, Justice Ginsburg
found the intangible benefits of VMI to be a great asset and a greater
concern to women denied them; in this area, VMI and VWIL were entire-
ly disparate. A VMI degree, she stated, carried with it the "'reputation
of the faculty, experience of the administration, position and influence of
marks and citations omitted and alteration in original).
224. Id.
225. Id. at 2284.
226. See id.
227. Id.
228. See id.
229. See id. at 2284 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1432
(W.D. Va. 1991), vacated, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), qffd, 116 S. Ct. at 2264) (al-
teration and brackets in original).
230. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2284-85.
231. Id. For example, VWIL's endowment commitments were $35 million, while
VMrs were $220 million-augmenting dramatically already the largest per-student
endowment in the United States. Id. at 2285.
232. Id. at 2285.
233. Id.
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the alumni, standing in the community, traditions and prestige.'""
These intangible considerations, Justice Ginsburg wrote, are incapable of
measurement, but surely VMI "'possesses [them] to a far greater degree'
than the VWIL program."' VMI's prestige and incredible resources,
along with Virginia's failure to provide a substantially comparable oppor-
tunity to women, convinced the Court that the only valid constitutional
remedy was to offer women nothing less than VM. 2"
B. Chief Justice Rehnquist's Concurring Opinion
Chief Justice Rehnquist favored precedent. In his view, Virginia merit-
ed an unclouded application of Craig's intermediate scrutiny standard;
that is, a gender classification must serve an important government ob-
jective and substantially relate to the achievement of that objective.2"
To support his position, the Chief Justice cited Craig and thirteen inter-
mediate scrutiny cases decided under Craig,'s including two that the
majority termed as "pathmarldng" decisions justifying the heightened
scrutiny level employed in Virginia.' The Chief Justice also asserted
that the majority's call for an exceedingly persuasive justification was
confusing and "best confined.., as an observation on the difficulty of
meeting the applicable test, not as a formulation of the test itself."' In
sum, Chief Justice Rehnquist adhered to the Court's traditional, "'firmly
established'" Craig principles.'
234. Id. at 2285-86 (quoting Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950)). Justice
Ginsburg found VWIL "reminiscent of the remedy Texas proposed 50 years ago" in
Sweatt. Id. at 2285. In Sweatt, Texas denied blacks entry into the University of Texas
Law School, but, in response to an adverse trial court equal protection ruling, the
University set up a separate law school for black students. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 632.
The Supreme Court found the separate school vastly inferior to the University of
Texas and ruled that because the separate educational opportunities were not sub-
stantially equivalent the Equal Protection Clause required the University of Texas Law
School to admit the black students. Id. at 636.
235. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2287 (quoting Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634).
236. Id.
237. Id. at 2288 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Ironically, in Craig, Justice Rehnqus;t
dissented, writing: The only redeeming feature of the Court's opinion, to my mind,
[i]s that it apparently signal[s] a retreat by those who joined the plurality opinion in
Frontiero v. Richardson.... [T]he Oklahoma statute challenged here need pass only
the 'rational basis' equal protection analysis." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 217-18
(1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
238. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2288 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
239. See id. at 2274 (citing J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994);
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982)).
240. Id. at 2288 (Rehnquist, C.J, concurring).
241. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 723).
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The majority's approach in evaluating the first of Virginia's two offered
objectives-providing diverse educational institutions-also disturbed the
Chief Justice. 2 He saw no reason for an inquiry into Virginia's nine-
teenth-century motivation for establishing VMI, and found the majority's
mewling over the prevalence of gender discrimination throughout
Virginia's history superfluous.' The Chief Justice asserted the proper
analysis focused only on Virginia's conduct since the Court's 1982 Hogan
decision.' As Chief Justice Rehnquist explained, "VMI was founded in
1839, and... admission was limited to men because under the then-pre-
vailing view men, not women, were destined for education. However
misguided this point of view may be by present-day standards, it surely
was not unconstitutional in 1839."2" Further, the Chief Justice stated
that the precedent prior to Hogan, relied upon by the majority,' was
of little value to Virginia in evaluating the legality of excluding women
from VMI. 247 Although decisions such as Reed established equal protec-
tion scrutiny for women, "[elven at [that] time... Virginia and VMI were
scarcely on notice that [Reed's] holding would be extended across the
constitutional board. They were entitled to believe that one 'swallow
doesn't make a summer' and await further developments."2"
Nevertheless, Chief Justice Rehnquist determined that Virginia's first
objective was a mere rationalization because Virginia did not seriously
reconsider VMI's policy even after Hogan put the State on notice that the
policy was questionable.' 9 If diversity was truly Virginia's objective,
then it served only men and remained problematic under the substantial-
ly related prong of Craig." He rejected Virginia's second objec-
tive-maintenance of the adversative method-as simply unimpor-
tant.
251
242. Id. at 2288-90 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
243. Id. at 2288-89 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
244. Id. at 2290 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
245. Id at 2288 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
246. See id at 2274-76. Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion cited Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71 (1971), as the Court's initial holding that women were due equal protection.
Virginia, 116 S. Ct at 2275.
247. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2289 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
248. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
249. Id. at 2289-90 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
250. Id. at 2290 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
251. Id. at 2290-91 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist took issue with the Court's decision as
to the proper remedy."2 He found the majority's required remedy un-
necessarily overbroad, instead suggesting gender-separate institutions
that would be equal in quality and "of the same overall calibre."2"
C. Justice Scalia's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Scalia premised his dissent on broad conceptual grounds," a
disagreement with the majority on the appropriate standard of re-
view,' and a scathing critique of virtually every conclusion reached by
the Court.2" The majority decision provided another example, stated
Justice Scalia, of the Court removing issues from the democratic process
and "inscribing one after another of the current preferences of the soci-
ety (and in some cases only the counter-majoritarian preferences of the
society's law-trained elite) into our Basic Law." 7 According to Justice
Scala, the Court had no reason to subject VMI to any form of consti-
tutional scrutiny.2" He asserted that the Constitution "takes no sides in
this educational debate," and VMI's male-only policy was an issue for the
legislature. 2' He maintained the function of the Court was to preserve
restrictions on government and prevent "backsliding," not to impose
upon the democratic process values based on popular whims of the
252. Id. at 2291 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
253. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
254. Id. at 2292-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting) Justice Scali 's philosophy on Constitu-
tional interpretation has marginalized him in recent years, and his dissents have
grown in number. Greenhouse, in Supreme Court's Decisions, a Clear Voice and a
Murmur, supra note 14, at A20. Court watchers note that these dissents are usually
"more likely to offend than to persuade." Id. Justice Scalia wrote in a recent dissent
that "[t]he Court must be living in another world. Day by day, case by case, it is
busy designing a Constitution for a country I do not recognize." Board of County
Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. 2361, 2373 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
255. Virginia, 116 S. Ct at 2293-97 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
256. Id. at 2298-309 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
257. Id. at 2292 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia took issue with what he
termed the Court's "deprecat[ion] ... of our forebears." Id. at 2291-92 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). He wrote,
Closeminded they were-as every age is, including our own, with regard to
matters it cannot guess, because it simply does not consider them debatable.
The virtue of a democratic system with a First Amendment is that it readily
enables the people, over time, to be persuaded that what they took for grant-
ed is not so, and to change their laws accordingly. That system is destroyed
if the smug assurances of each age are removed from the democratic process
and written into the Constitution.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
258. Id. at 2292-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
259. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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time.2' Specifically, Justice Scalia stressed the great importance of the
VMI tradition:
"[W]hen a practice not expressly prohibited by the text of the Bill of Rights bears
the endorsement of a long tradition of open, widespread, and unchallenged use
that dates back to the beginning of the Republic, we have no proper basis for
strildng it down." The same applies mutatis mutandis, to a practice asserted to
be in violation of the post-Civil War Fourteenth Amendment28 '
The democratic process may change traditions such as VMI, but, accord-
ing to Justice Scalia, the majority's assertion that VMI "has been uncon-
stitutional through the centuries is not law, but politics-smuggled-into-
law."
262
Justice Scalia recognized, however, that his philosophy would not win
five votes anytime in the near future, and it was better to participate in
"creating" a Constitution than to sit by while others created one.262 Con-
sequently, he too evaluated VMI within the Court's precedential equal
protection framework.2' Nevertheless, he remained at odds with Jus-
tice Ginsburg's opinion. Justice Scalia asserted that the Court did not
"apply honestly" the intermediate scrutiny standard that it had applied to
gender classifications for two decades.2" The Court recited that test, he
noted, but never answered the question in any form resembling Craig or
Hogan.2" In ignoring precedent and instead requiring an exceedingly
persuasive justification, Justice Scalia found Virginia to destabilize what
had been well-settled law and "muddy the waters" of equal protec-
260. Id. at 2292 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
261. Id. at 2292-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Rutan v. Republican Party of IIl.,
497 U.S. 62, 95 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)) (internal citations omitted).
262. Id. at 2293. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia also relied on the tradition of
The Citadel, founded only three years after VMI, because the majority's decision
would also force that school to admit women. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
263. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court favors current notions so fixedly that it
is willing to write them into the Constitution of the United States by application of
custom-built 'tests.' This is not the interpretation of a Constitution, but the creation
of one.").
264. Id. at 2293-97 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia evaluated VMI under tradi-
tional intermediate scrutiny analysis. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
265. Id. at 2293 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
266. Id. at 2294 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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tion."7 The Court's decision, wrote Justice Scalia, was simply
"irresponsible."
26
VMI passed the "correct test," asserted Justice Scalia, because single-
gender education and the adversative method of education were both
substantially related to Virginia's "important state interest in providing
effective college education for its citizens."2" He found the district
court's factual conclusions to provide more than enough evidence on the
benefits of both single-gender educational environments and the adversa-
tive method °.2 ' Therefore, concluded Justice Scalia, even if the Court ig-
nored his broad assertions on constitutional philosophy, VMI easily met
the intermediate scrutiny requirements.27 '
Confident that he had proven VMI's policy constitutional under a prop-
er application of intermediate scrutiny, Justice Scalia turned his pen to a
"series of contentions that are irrelevant or erroneous as a matter of law,
foreclosed by the record in this case, or both."2" Conspicuously uncon-
cerned with maintaining a good relationship with his fellow justices, he
scorned and lectured the majority, methodically slashing almost evexy
one of its conclusions.27
267. Id. at 2295 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In characteristically different styles, the Chief
Justice and Justice Scalia agreed: they both viewed intermediate scrutiny as the prop-
er standard. See id. at 2288 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring); id. at 2293-94 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
268. Id. at 2295 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
269. Id. at 2296 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In the manner Justice Scalia framed his
application of the intermediate scrutiny test, VMI would only fail the test if a court
concluded that either "effective college education" was not an important government
interest or that single-gender education was not substantially related to that interest.
See id. His framing of the issue in a different manner than both the majority and
concurring opinions illustrates that intermediate scrutiny is largely a play on words,
and decisions rest largely on the gut feelings of Justices. See supra notes 112-16 and
accompanying text (discussing application of intermediate scrutiny).
270. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2296-97. Justice Scalia did not address to what degree
VMI benefited different genders, but cited a significant mass of evidence from the
record to buttress his conclusion that single-gender education at VMI was beneficial:
"That single-gender education at the college level is beneficial to both sexes
is a fact established in this case."
The evidence establishing that fact was overwhelming-indeed, "virtually
uncontradicted." .. .. "One empirical study in evidence, not questioned by any
expert, demonstrates that single-sex colleges provide better educational expe-
riences than coeducational institutions."
Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2296 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Virginia,
766 F. Supp. 1407, 1415 (W.D. Va 1991), vacated, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), affd,
116 S. Ct. at 2264) (citations omitted).
271. Id. at 2293 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
272. Id. at 2298 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
273. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Justice Scalia began with a purely legal argument. He stated the
majority's implicit use of "strict scrutiny [was] without antecedent in []
sex-discrimination cases" and found that it "discredit[ed] the Court's
decision."74
He then addressed the majority's assertion that VMI's stated goal of
educational diversity was a pretext for discrimination. 76 This conclu-
sion, he pointed out, could be true only if VMI's Mission Study Commit-
tee held a "base motive" for its report recommending that the school
remain all male.27 To the contrary, proclaimed Justice Scalia, the
Committee's "sober 3-year study, and the analysis it produced, utterly re-
fute[d] the claim that VMI [] elected to maintain its all-male student-body
composition for some misogynistic reason."27
Justice Scalia ridiculed the majority's search for an explicit statement
by Virginia in VMI's recorded history as to its actual purpose in maintain-
ing an all-male institution.m In spirited language, he proclaimed that
the Court should not require a state's actions to
be accompanied-in anticipation of litigation and on pain of being found to lack a
relevant state interest-by a lawyer's contemporaneous recitation of the State's
purposes. The Constitution is not some giant Administrative Procedure Act, which
imposes upon the States the obligation to set forth a 'statement of basis and
purpose' for their sovereign acts.2"
Justice Scalia then described the hypocrisy of this requirement, noting
that while the Court required a recitation of Virginia's actual purpose in
the record before it would recognize the proffered purpose of diversity,
nowhere was the majority's assumption that Virginia established VMI "to
keep women in their place" recorded.' He stated: "[Slince the 1839
policy was no more explicitly recorded than the Court contends the pres-
ent one is, the mere fact that today's Commonwealth continues to fund
VMI "'is enough to answer the [United States'] contention that the [classi-
fication] was the accidental by-product of a traditional way of thinking
about females.'" 1
274. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
275. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
276. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
277. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
278. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
279. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1994)).
280. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
281. Id. at 2298-99 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450
U.S. 464, 471 n.6 (plurality opinion) (quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320
(1977) (quoting Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223 (1977) (Stevens, J., concur-
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As for the majority's call for a recording of diversity as Virginia's actu-
al motive, Justice Scalia went on to argue that although this requirement
was nonsensical, Virginia had in fact offered VMI as a diverse education-
al institution on the record.' The 1990 Report of the Virginia Commis-
sion on the University of the 21st Century specifically pronounced diver-
sity as a goal of Virginia's educational policy. 8' Thus, accepting the
need for such a statement, "the plain fact, which the Court does not
deny, is that it was [there]."'
Justice Scalia quickly threw aside the majority's contention that VMI
did not advance the purpose of diversity by surmising that "[tihe appar-
ent theory of this argument is that unless Virginia pursues a great deal of
diversity, its pursuit of some diversity must be a sham."28 Justice
Scalia's answer to this was simple: Virginia could not afford all possible
permutations of schools and the Court should not penalize the State for
coordinating an all-male school along with the other institutions it "as-
sist[ed]-which include[d] four women's colleges."'
Justice Scalia's final argument with respect to the asserted diversity
purpose behind VMI's all-male character related to the majority's asser-
tion that VMI alone, with no authority over any other state institution,
did not have the capacity to affect a statewide policy of educational
diversity.287 VMI's autonomy, Justice Scalia chided, did not impede its
pursuit of diversity among Virginia's institutions: "If it were impossible
for individual human beings (or groups of human beings) to act autono-
mously in effective pursuit of a common goal, the game of soccer would
not exist."' Justice Scalia further countered this argument by pointing
out that VMI was not entirely autonomous because the Virginia legisla-
ring)))) (internal quotation marks omitted and alteration in original).
282. Id. at 2299 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
283. Id.
284. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
285. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
286. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
287. Id. at 2300 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
288. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ture could simply cease funding if it felt that VMI was not serving a valid
purpose.'
Next, Justice Scalia addressed the majority's rejection of expert testi-
mony offered at trial, which suggested the adversative method of educa-
tion was unsuitable to women, because the court felt these findings
merely restated the State's own witnesses.90 It is: "inexcusable," assert-
ed Justice Scalia, to tell Virginia that it must justify its program and then
ignore findings that rest on evidence proffered in an attempt to meet that
justification." Pointing to the fact that even the United States' expert
witness "called himself a believer in single-sex education," he proposed
that the Supreme Court could have saved the parties the trouble, time,
and expense of a trial because the majority never addressed the findings
of the courts below, instead supplanting them with
the Justices' own view of the world, which the Court proceeds to support with (1)
references to observations of someone who is not a witness, nor even an educa-
tional expert, nor even a judge who reviewed the record or participated in the
judgment below, but rather a judge who merely dissented from the Court of
Appeals' decision not to rehear this case en banc,'. .. (2) citations of
nonevidentiary materials such as amicus curiae briefs filed in this Court .... and
(3) various historical anecdotes designed to demonstrate that Virginia's support
for VMI as currently constituted reminds the Justices of the "bad old days."'
This approach, wrote Justice Scalia, "rendered the trial a sham."'
The next issue Justice Scalia addressed was the majority's statement
that Virginia had misperceived precedent by focusing its argument on
289. Id, (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent transforms into mockery in a footnote
following this argument, stating:
The Court, unfamiliar with the Commonwealth's policy of diverse and inde-
pendent institutions, and in any event careless of state and local traditions,
must be forgiven by Virginians for quoting a reference to 'the Charlottesville
campus' of the University of Virginia... The University of Virginia ...
occupies the portion of Charlottesville known, not as the 'campus,' but as the
'grounds.' More importantly, even if it were a 'campus,' there would be no
need to specify 'the Charlottesville campus,' as one might refer to the
Bloomington or Indianapolis campus of Indiana University. Unlike university
systems with which the Court is perhaps more familiar, such as those in
New York ... ,Illinois .... and California ... there is only one Univer-
sity of Virginia.
Id. at 2300 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
290. Id. at 2300-01 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
291. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
292. Id. at 2301 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
293. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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means rather than end.' VMI's mission was analogous to the mission
of every college in Virginia.' Justice Scalia argued it was not VMI's
mission which was at issue-it was the distinct way VMI accomplished
that mission through the all-male adversative method.'s And, he and
the courts below had found, "that mission [was] not 'great enough to
accommodate women.' " 7
Justice Scalia also disagreed with the majority's claim "that VMI would
not have to change very much if it were to admit women." 's His "prin-
cipal response" to that argument was that because VMI survived inter-
mediate scrutiny, the point was irrelevant.'s Eager to argue every point
with the majority, however, Justice Scalia went on to state that even if it
was relevant, the majority was in error because forcing VMI to admit
women would frustrate the adversarial method." Armed with findings
of fact from the district court and the Fourth Circuit, Justice Scalia con-
cluded that the admission of women would significantly alter VMI's
training methods and eventually lead to the demise of the adversative
system.
30
1
In his sixth and final challenge to the majority's conclusions, Justice
Scalia attacked the dismissal of VWIL.2 Although he asserted that any
discussion on VWIL was irrelevant because VMI passed intermediate
scrutiny and thus required no remedy, Justice Scalia went on to address
the point." 3 Once again, he pointed to the majority's decision to ignore
lower court findings of fact solely because the majority found them
based on overbroad generalizations as to the proper roles of men and
women.' Accepting the lower courts' finding that the State carefully
designed VWIL to produce "substantially similar outcomes to VMI's in an
all-female environment" because the adversative method was not appro-
294. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
295. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
296. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
297. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
298. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
299. Id. at 2302 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
300. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
301. Id, (Scali, J., dissenting).
302. Id. at 2303 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
303. Id. (Scaia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia pointed out that the Court did not rely
on the absence of an all-male nursing school in its Hogan opinion. Id. at 2302-03
(Scalia, J., dissenting). ("As Virginia notes, if a program restricted to one sex is nec-
essarily unconstitutional unless there is a parallel program restricted to the other sex,
'the opinion in Hogan could have ended with its first footnote, which observed that
'Mississippi maintains no other single-sex public university or college."'" (quoting Brief
for Cross-Petitioners at 38, Virginia (Nos. 94-1941, 94-2107) (quoting Mississippi Univ.
v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 n.1, 720 (1982)))).
304. Id. at 2303 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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priate for women, Justice Scalia deferred to Mary Baldwin College's
statement on the issue:
"It would have been possible to develop the VWIL program to more closely resem-
ble VMI, with adversative techniques associated with the rat line and barracks-like
living quarters. Simply replicating an existing program would have required far
less thought, research, and educational expertise. But such a facile approach
would have produced a paper program with no real prospect of successful imple-
mentation.""
Thus, by showing that Virginia had taken the most intelligent path in
providing a successful analogue to VMI, Justice Scalia rejected the
majority's call for an exact analogue with equal resources and creden-
tials.' In fact, Justice Scalia did not even see fit to address the great
disparities between VMI and VWLL underscored by the majority.'
Finally, Justice Scalia addressed Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurrence.
Justice Scalia disagreed with the Chief Justice's determination that there
was no evidence that diversity was Virginia's true purpose in maintaining
VMI.' Not only was there evidence in the record that this was
Virginia's intention, but "[a] legal culture that has forgotten the concept
of res ipsa loquitur deserves the fate that it today decrees for VMI."0
Justice Scalia also took issue with the Chief Justice's quick dismissal of
VMrs second offered objective of maintaining the adversative model."0
The Chief Justice, wrote Justice Scalia, ignored factual findings and was
"simply wrong."3 Justice Scalia's third and final disagreement with the
Chief Justice was over the latter's assertion that Hogan provided notice
that Virginia's maintenance of an all-male school, absent an all-female
counterpart, was unconstitutional. 3 1 2 Justice Scalia countered by stating
that Virginia responded to Hogan with a thoughtful study into VMI's
legitimacy and established VWIL.3"3 This was not enough to satisfy the
majority, he noted, and in any event Virginia already supported four four-
year women's colleges in Virginia.3 4
305. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for Mary Baldwin College as Amicus
Curiae at 5, Virginia (No. 94-1941)).
306. Id. at 2303 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
307. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
308. Id. at 2303-04 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
309. Id. at 2304 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
310. Id. at 2304-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
311. Id. at 2304 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
312. Id at 2305 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
313. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
314. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The breadth of the Court's decision infuriated Justice Scalia, and he
believed it would seriously impact all levels of single-gender educa-
tion."' Although he recognized that the -majority limited its decision to
"unique" educational programs, he argued that all single-sex programs
are by definition unique.316 Thus Virginia made the chance of litigation
so high and the new standard so difficult to meet that it effectively end-
ed single-gender education in America, for "[n]o state official in his right
mind will buy such a high-cost, high-risk lawsuit.""7 Further, Justice
Scalia asserted that under the majority's ruling, the states may deny pri-
vate institutions government aid if they discriminate on the basis of
gender.3"8
The dissent concluded with a hope that Virginia was useless law.:
The majority opinion, Justice Scalia pointed out, had gone out of its way
to label the case "unique."" Further, the Court often abandoned princi-
ples of law applied in previous gender classification decisions, and might
never look to the principles developed in Virginia for precedent."I Jus-
tice Scalia was both "happy and ashamed to say that this abandonment
provided hope." '
V. IMPACT OF THE COURT'S DECISION
The Supreme Court's Virginia decision certainly had two casud-
ties-the decision forced the country's only two public men's military
colleges to admit women.' On the other hand, VWIL will likely remain
315. Id. at 2305-08 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
316. Id. at 2306 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
317. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
318. Id. at 2306-07 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
319. Id. at 2307 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
320. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
321. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
322. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
323. The Citadel, a Charleston, South Carolina military college, agreed to admit
women within 48 hours of the Supreme Court's Virginia decision. Michael Janofsky,
Citadel, Bowing to Court, Says It Will Admit Women, N.Y. TIMEs, June 29, 1996, at
A6. Under a federal court order, Shannon Faulkner became the first woman to attend
The Citadel in March 1995, but she withdrew within a week. id.; see Faulkner v.
Jones, 51 F.3d 440 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 352 (1995). The VMI Alumni
Association, which spent approximately $10 million dollars in the legal battle to de-
fend VMI's all-male status, attempted to purchase VMI so that it could maintain its
single-sex status. Mike Allen, Defiant VMI to Admit Women, But Will Not Ease Rules
for Them, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1996, at Al; Elizabeth Levitan Spaid, Last All-Male
Bastion Faces Its Own 'D-Day,' CHRISrIAN Sci. MoNrrOR, Sept. 20, 1996, at 5; To Ke,.p
an All-Male VMI, Its Alumni Consider Buying It, N.Y. TIMEs, June 30, 1996, at All.
The attempt failed, and VMI's Board of Visitors voted to admit women on September
21, 1996. Allen, supra, at Al. Two women attended the first coed open house for
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intact.'S Otherwise, the opaque holding left almost everyone guessing
at its import. Those directly involved with single-gender programs must
do more than guess, however, as they decide if their single-gender char-
acter is constitutional. Indeed, private single-gender universities and
secondary public schools with single-gender programs reading the Vir-
ginia opinion may fear that the decision could result in lower courts
using Justice Ginsburg's heightened scrutiny against them. 25
There are eighty-four private women's colleges32 and three private
all-male colleges in the United States.27 Justice Scalia argued that the
majority's rationale threatens the existence of all eighty-seven institu-
tions.' The Attorney General who initially filed the VMI lawsuit in
1990 had a similar opinion, and declared Justice Ginsburg's Virginia
opinion "'the death knell for gender discrimination where public funds
are used.'"' Read literally, however, Virginia leaves largely untouched
the issue of whether these schools are now vulnerable to an equal pro-
tection challenge. That issue rests on the complex state action doctrine,
another murky area of law with a history of unpredictability.' While it
is true that public and private colleges are distinct creatures, with public
institutions under the direct control of state legislatures and private
schools governed by private bodies, a court may very well consider a
private institution receiving substantial government aid a state actor.331
If so, any discrimination on the basis of sex would be an equal protec-
tion violation and thus the destruction of that school's single-gender
prospective students. Coed Open House Draws 2 Women to VMI Campus, VIRGINIAN-
PILOT, Oct 19, 1996, at B5.
324. See VMI Admitting Women Won't SpeU End of VWIL, VIRGINIAN-PUMOT, Sept. 29,
1996, at B7.
325. Twenty-six private single-gender institutions combined to submit an amicus
brief in support of single-sex education. See Brief for Twenty-Six Private Women's
Colleges as Amicus Curiae, Virginia (No. 94-1941).
326. Mike Allen, Separatism Is In, Except for White Men, N.Y. TIMES, June 30,
1996, at D5. Total enrollment at women's colleges is approximately 120,000 students.
Id.
327. The all-male colleges are Hampden-Sydney College in Virginia, Wabash College
in Indiana, and Morehouse College in Atlanta. Id. Total enrollment of all three col-
leges is under 5000 students. Id.
328. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct 2264, 2306-07 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
329. Katia Hetter, End of an AU-Male Era, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 8, 1996,
at 50 (quoting former U.S. Attorney General Richard Thornburgh).
330. The Supreme Court's thinIdng on the subject is presented in Blum v. Yaretsky,
457 U.S. 991 (1982). See generally ROTUNDA & NoWAK, supra note 26, at 494-509.
331. See infra notes 33240 and accompanying text.
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policy. Although finding a private college to be a state actor is unlikely, it
is not impossible. Private institutions count on government for a substan-
tial amount of financial assistance, deriving approximately nineteen per-
cent of their budgets directly from the government, with another large
portion routed through students in the form of financial aid (loans, schol-
arships, and grants).' In addition, private colleges highly covet charita-
ble status under the tax laws." Indeed, without government support
most private institutions could not survive.
The Virginia dissent also pointed out that the issue is not necessarily
whether the private institution is a state actor, but whether the "govern-
ment itself would be violating the Constitution by providing state support
to single-sex colleges."' This is not a novel idea. In Norwood v. Harri-
son' the Supreme Court invalidated a grant of books to students who
attended racially discriminatory schools under a state law that provided
free books to all students.' Norwood involved a racial, not a gender,
classification, but with Justice Ginsburg's declaration in Virginia that the
Court does not equate gender classifications with race classifications "for
all purposes," 7 private schools are left to wonder if the Norwood rule
is one for which racial and gender classifications are equatable.3s If so,
the future of single-gender education in America is in jeopardy.-'
An application of Norwood to gender classifications is a subject de-
serving much more attention than the scope of this Note allows, but if
the Court exercises what it perceives as its broad power to overturn
legislative decisions-based on its newfound ability to decipher legisla-
tive motive,' 4 single-gender private schools certainly provide an op-
portunity. There is a major deterrent to exercising this power. effectively
332. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2306 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Brief for Mary
Baldwin College as Amicus Curiae at 22 n.13, Virginia (No. 94-1941) (citing U.S.
DEPT. OF EDUC., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 38
& n. (1993))).
333. Id. at 2306 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
334. Id. at 2307 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
335. 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
336. Id. at 471.
337. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2275.
338. In a similar case, the Court upheld a grant of textbooks to students of reli-
gious schools. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). The Court premised the
holding in Al/en, however, on the protection of free association and free exercise of
religion rights. See id. Gender classifications have no such basis and are more easily
analogized to racial classification cases because gender, like race, is an immutable
characteristic. See Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
339. For a persuasive argument that Virginia will have little or no effect on private
institutions, see Sara L Mandelbaum, "As VMI Goes ... : The Domino Effect and
Other Stubborn Myths, 6 SETON HALL CONST. LJ. 979 (1996).
340. See supra notes 209-15 and accompanying text.
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ending the education of the 125,000 students enrolled at private single-
sex colleges"' would be a giant leap even for this "most illiberal
Court.
" 342
Many opponents of VMI argued that even if the Court determined that
public funding to private single-gender colleges violated equal protection,
women's colleges would nevertheless remain valid because they address
the historic lack of educational opportunity available to women and pro-
mote equal opportunity, thus fulfilling a "compensatory purpose."3'
This argument cannot be taken seriously, for although women have un-
doubtedly been the subject of past discrimination, they now enjoy great
success in American universities: last year, women earned more
associate's, bachelor's, and master's degrees than men.' Surely, the
gender having greater success is in no need of broad special treatment.
Further, preferences for women "reinforc[e] precisely the same paternal-
istic stereotypes-women need special treatment and protection."3"
There is also the possibility that Virginia does not forbid single-gender
public education in general. Justice Ginsburg limited the holding in Vir-
ginia by specificaliy stating that the Court was not faced with the ques-
tion of whether states can provide separate but equal institutions for
males and females:
[I]t is the mission of some single-sex schools "to dissipate, rather than perpetuate,
traditional gender classifications." We do not question the State's prerogative
evenhandedly to support diverse educational opportunities. We address specifical-
ly and only an educational opportunity recognized by the District Court and the
Court of Appeals as "unique," an opportunity available only at Virginia's premier
military institute, the State's sole single-sex public university or college.m
It was clear to the Court that VMI and VWIL were incomparable, and
thus, its evaluation of the separate opportunities available to males and
341. Of the 125,000 students, 120,000 are women. Allen, supra note 326, at D5.
342. See Virginia, 116 S. Ct at 2292 (Scalia, J., dissenting). A "blueprint for defend-
ing" private women's colleges is available. See Jennifer R. Cowan, Distinguishing
Private Women's Colleges Prom the VMI Decision, 30 COLUM. J.L & Soc. PRoBS. 137,
137-38 (1997) (asserting that private women's college are not unconstitutional under
VMD.
343. See Jeffrey Rosen, Single-Sex Schools and Double Standards, N.Y. TMES, July
3, 1996, at A23.
344. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 191,
tbl. 300 (1996). Women earned 59.296 of associate's degrees, 54.3% of bachelor's de-
grees, and 51.896 of master's degrees. Id. Men, however, took home more professional
degrees (58.5%) and doctorates (62.8%). Id.
345. Rosen, supra note 343, at A23.
346. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2276 n.7 (internal citations omitted).
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females was logically simple."47 The Court did not question a state's
prerogative to evenhandedly support diverse schools, but neither did it
endorse single-sex public institutions.' Although this ambiguity ampli-
fied the legal dilemma currently faced by public secondary schools wish-
ing to establish single-sex programs, it has not halted the recent fervor to
open such schools. For example, New York's East Harlem School District
Four opened the Young Women's Leadership School, a girls-only public
school, in September 1996.' The ACLU, the National Organization for
Women (NOW), and other groups promptly filed a lawsuit seeking to
block the operation of the school.' Although the legal protests may
win in the courts, there is a rise in the popularity of single-gender pro-
grams across the country: national enrollment at private girls schools
jumped eight percent between 1991 and 1996, and new single-gender
schools opened recently in California and Maine." t While most involved
admit that the effect of Virginia on these programs is unknown," offi-
cials at the Board of Education in East Harlem claim that they can pro-
vide Justice Ginsburg with an exceedingly persuasive justification for
their all-girl school.' The Board, however, is probably in error courts
were not kind to the gender programs before Virginia,' and the
decision's more rigorous standard for gender discrimination only makes
single-gender programs that much more difficult to justify.'
347. Id. at 2284-87.
348. See id. at 2276-77, 2285.
349. Scott Baldauf, Merits, Demerits of Single-Sex Ed Raised in Harlem: Separate
but Equal?, CHRIuSTAN Sc. MONIoR, Sept. 4, 1996, at 1.
350. Jacques Steinberg, Rights Groups Seek to Bar Girls-Only School, N.Y. TIMFS,
Aug. 23, 1996, at B2. For a discussion and criticism of the ACLU and NOW's ap-
proach to ending single-gender education, see Anita K. Blair, The New Move Equal
Protection Clause, 44 FED. LAW. 35, Jan. 1997.
351. Baldauf, supra note 349, at 1.
352. Mary B. W. Tabor, Planners of a New Public School for Girls Look to Two
Other Cities, N.Y. TIMEs, July 22, 1996, at B1 (discussing the Young Women's Lead-
ership School in East Harlem, Philadelphia High School for Girls, and Western High
School in Baltimore).
353. Steinberg, supra note 350, at B4. One member of the Board said the justifica-
tion was that "girls did not do as well in math and science in co-education as they
do in a single-gender setting." Id, Nevertheless, under Justice Ginsburg's VMI logic, if
one boy would flourish in the all-girls school, the school must admit him. See Vir-
ginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2280.
354. In 1991, the Detroit School Board began to implement a program for a boys-
only school to aid inner-city youth. Garrett v. Board of Educ. of School Dist of De-
troit, 775 F. Supp. 1004, 1006 (E.D. Mich. 1991). The ACLU sued, and a district court
entered an injunction, applying the intermediate scrutiny test as developed in Hogan.
Id. at 1005-08, 1014. In response, the Board of Education promptly abandoned the
plan. See Detroit Plan to Aid Blacks With All-Boy School Abandoned, LA. TIMES,
Nov. 8, 1991, at A4.
355. See supra notes 185-236 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's new
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Virginia substantially alters the legal framework used to evaluate
gender discrimination cases.' Unfortunately, Virginia also revives an
erratic history of gender classification decisions. 1 7 Before Virginia, in-
termediate scrutiny "seemed to mean different things to different appeals
courts."' Now, it means different things to everyone, as constitutional
lawyers begin to argue over the Court's mishandling of intermediate scru-
tiny and the implication of what is presumably a new standard in gender
discrimination jurisprudence. 3
In 1973, Frontiero v. Richardson brazenly applied strict scrutiny as the
appropriate standard of review for gender discrimination, and the Court
quickly repudiated the decision.' Virginia did not go as far as
Frontiero, but arguably heightened the standard in just as clumsily a
manner. The Court's resolve to maintain the new standard is unknown,
but if the past is any indication, the next case might overturn, change, or
simply ignore it." If the heightened standard endures, state gender
classifications will be incredibly difficult to defend.
standard).
356. See Hope Viner Samborn, Scrutiny Scrutinized, Case Sparks Debate on Inter-
mediate Standard, A.B.A. J., Sept 1996, at 29 (discussing effects of United States v.
Virginia on intermediate scrutiny standard); supra notes 211-15, 238-42, 262-68 and
accompanying text.
357. See discussion supra notes 65-117, and accompanying text.
358. Greenhouse, The Supreme Court; Discrimination; Military Colleges Can't Bar
Women, High Court Rules, supra note 14, at Al (quoting Judith Lichtnan, President
of the Women's Legal Defense Fund).
359. See, e.g., Martin A. Schwartz, Equal Protection Developments, N.Y.LJ., Sept 17,
1996, at 3 (asserting that although there are minor differences, Virginia's equal pro-
tection "analysis fairly resembles strict judicial scrutiny"); Anita K Blair, Junior High
and VMI, WASH. PosT, Sept. 30, 1996, at A22 (opinion piece written by executive vice
president and general counsel of the Independent Women's Forum asserting that a
new level of "skeptical scrutiny" was created by Justice Ginsburg in Virginia); Erwin
Chemerinsky, Breakdown in the Levels of Scrutiny, TRIAL, Mar. 1, 1997, at 6-8 (as-
serting that with Virginia, the Supreme Court made intermediate scrutiny "virtually
indistinguishable from strict scrutiny"); Rosemary C. Salamone, The VMI Case: Affir-
mation of Equal Educational Opportunity for Women, TRIAL, Oct 1, 1996 (asserting
that with Virginia, the Supreme Court did not move to strict scrutiny, but applied
intermediate scrutiny with "bite"). See generally Wilfred M. McClay, Of "Rats" and
Women, COMMENTARY, Sept. 1, 1996, at 46 (outlining disagreements within the
women's movement over the impact of Virginia).
360. See supra notes 87-95 and accompanying text (analyzing Frontier' decision).
361. See supra notes 65-111 and accompanying text (discussing ad hoc nature of
Court's past gender-classification decisions).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Vague but established precedent was available to guide the Court's
decision in United States v. Virginia.'s The Court could have easily
confined a ruling for or against VMI within the Craig substantial relation-
ship standard.' Indeed, precedent required this application, and a re-
sult based on the Court's instinct, rather than a proper objective applica-
tion of the law, would have fallen in line with past decisions.' Virgin-
ia, however, serves as an important reminder that gender politics is alive
and well even in the Supreme Court's chambers. A veteran women's
rights proponent guided the Court into an opinion that vindicated her
legal career' and destroyed a loved tradition, but provided little in the
form of honest judging. In the process, the Court not only cast the appro-
priate scrutiny standard into doubt, but irresponsibly complicated the fu-
ture of beneficial and much needed educational programs well beyond
the unique program it purported to address."s Ironically, as Justice
Ginsburg admonished Virginia for providing a mere rationalization for its
actions, she essentially followed the same path as the accused-claiming
to apply precedent and objectively arrive at a conclusion, but in fact
revising two decades of entrenched law.'?
BRENT L. CASLIN
362. See supra notes 112-16, 237-41, 265-71 and accompanying text.
363. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
364. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
365. Robert Marquand, Male-oanly Military School Must Admit Female Cadets: Court
Bolsters Protections for Women in Virginia Case, CHRISTIAN SCa. MONITOR, June 27,
1996, at 1.
366. See discussion supra Part V.
367. See supra notes 112-17, 238-41, 265-71 and accompanying text. For a discussion
by the Court on the importance of following precedent, see Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2114-17 (1995) (stating that "any departure from the
doctrine of stare decisis demands special justification").
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